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SYMPOSIUM
THE ROLE OF PATENT PROTECTION IN
(CLEAN/GREEN) TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER*
Bronwyn H. Hallt & Christian Helmerstt
Abstract
will require the development
mitigation
change
Global climate
and diffusion of a large number and variety of new technologies. How
will patentprotection affect this process? In this paper we first review
the evidence on the role of patents for innovation and international
technology transfer in general. The literature suggests that patent
protection in a host country encourages technology transfer to that
country but that its impact on innovation and development is much
more ambiguous. We then discuss the implications of these findings
and other technology-specific evidence for the diffusion of climate
change-related technologies. We conclude that the "double
externality" problem, that is the presence of both environmental and
knowledge externalities, implies that IP may not be the ideal and
cannot be the only policy instrument to encourage innovation in this
area and that the range and variety of green technologies as well as
the need for local adaptation of technologies means that patent
protection may be neither availablenor useful in some settings.
1.

INTRODUCTION

The worldwide challenge of climate change mitigation has led to
an increased interest in the mechanisms that encourage the
development and adoption of new technologies. In particular, recent
* Parts of this survey are based on presentations by the first author to a WIPO
Conference in Mexico City, January 2008 and a KDI Conference in Seoul, February 2010. We
are grateful to participants at those conferences and to Estelle Derclaye and Fabio Montobbio
for comments on an earlier draft.
t University of California at Berkeley and University of Maastricht.
bhhall@econ.berkeley.edu
tf CEP LSE and CSAE University of Oxford. c.r.helmers@lse.ac.uk
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rapid economic growth in several large developing economies has
focused policy attention on the role of technology transfer and
technology development in countries that are not generally on the
technology frontier in facilitating the use of clean technologies. In
addition to the obvious fact that raising the standard of living in such
countries to levels enjoyed in the West without a great deal of energy
and environment-related innovation would have detrimental
consequences for global warming, it is also true that rapid growth
means a great deal of new investment, and new investment is an
opportunity for substantial upgrading of technologies. At the same
time, according to existing forecasts, the countries contributing most
to climate change are not those that will be affected most heavily by
the consequences. The geographical disparity, placing developing
countries at a disadvantage, poses additional incentive problems to the
development and transfer of green technologies and the setting of
research priorities.
The emission of greenhouse gases leads to a range of welldocumented consequences, such as increases in the average global
temperature, greater variation in temperatures across time, increased
frequency and intensity of extreme weather-related events, and
average sea-level rise (IPCC, 2007). The potential damages induced
by climate change are manifold, in particular for developing countries
where climate change is expected to have its most severe
repercussions. Developing countries depend to a large extent on the
agricultural sector, which is particularly vulnerable to climatic
changes (World Bank, 2010). Climate change may also have a
negative impact on public health in developing countries by for
example increasing malaria morbidity and mortality (Tol, 2008;
WHO, 2009). Another important consequence is the increased risk of
natural disasters, mostly in coastal areas of developing countries.
Contemplating these risks, climate change may also increase the
likelihood of displacement, political unrest and violent conflict in
developing countries. Developing countries, therefore, have a strong
interest in containing climate change and mitigating its consequences
through the development and diffusion of green technologies.
The development and diffusion of technology in the context of
climate change poses a formidable challenge due to the presence of a
"double externality":
First, environmental pollution is a textbook example of an
activity producing a negative externality, i.e., "an unintended
consequence of market decisions which affect individuals other than
the decision maker" as the social costs associated with pollution
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exceed private costs (Stavins, 2008,1). Second, knowledge required
for the development of (green) technologies is characterized by nonexcludability, i.e., other actors cannot be excluded from accessing and
using the knowledge produced by the original source and non-rivalry
or non-exhaustibility of knowledge, i.e., if one actor uses some
specific knowledge, the value of its use is not reduced by other actors'
also using it. Due to these characteristics, "firms can acquire
information created by others without paying for that information in a
market transaction, and the creators (or current owners) of the
information have no effective recourse, under prevailing laws, if other
firms utilize information so acquired" (Grossman and Helpman,
1991,16). In this sense, incomplete appropriability of knowledge
represents an externality and thus leads to a gap between private and
social returns to innovation.' Addressing these externalities
individually is challenging; in reality, however, the two externalities
also interact, which further compounds the problem (Jaffe et al.,
2005). For example, there is enormous uncertainty linked to both
climate change and to the development and effectiveness of new
technologies. The interaction of uncertainties associated with climate
change and innovation complicates the design of appropriate policy
interventions to mitigate the impact of and also adapt to climate
change (Heal and Kristrdm, 2002). What is more, both externalities
act on a global scale, which poses a particularly difficult problem in
their mitigation.
The presence of the dual externality problem implies that at least
two different policy instruments are needed. For example, addressing
environmental externalities and knowledge spillovers simultaneously
through targeted R&D subsidies is likely to fail, largely because two
sets of actors are involved; the producers of technology will respond
to the subsidy, but adoption of green technologies resulting from
subsidized research will not occur at an optimal scale in the absence
of a policy intervention directly targeting diffusion (we discuss this
"energy efficiency paradox" further below). Because of the presence
of sunk switching costs, for potential users to be persuaded to replace
existing technologies with green ones requires either a clear price
signal that energy costs are high, (and will stay high), or subsidies that
can overcome the sunk costs. 2 Acemoglu et al. (2009) make the same
1. For a recent discussion of this point see Chapter 1.5 in Greenhalgh and Rogers
(2010).
2. While subsidies can lead to diffusion, they may fail to lead to actual use of a new
technology. For example, in the case of improved cooking stoves (ICS) that rely on biomass in
developing countries, subsidies have been used to help overcome the large up-front investment
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argument in an endogenous growth model that allows for
technological change directed either towards carbon-emitting or green
technologies. In a setting in which polluting technologies are initially
more productive, the authors show that research subsidies are needed
to redirect innovation towards climate change-related technologies.
However, a tax penalizing carbon emissions is also needed to address
the environmental externality. Their analysis suggests that policy
intervention in the form of subsidies and taxes is needed only
temporarily, although delaying the intervention is costly.
IP has been widely studied as a means to addressing the
externality that results from imperfect appropriability of knowledge.
The trade-off between a static efficiency loss due to higher prices in
the presence of patents and potential dynamic gains from providing
incentives for investment in innovation is well-known (Nordhaus,
1969). However, given the presence of the environmental externality,
potential interactions between the environmental and knowledge
externalities, the global dimension of the problem and the vast range
of different green technologies applicable to the problem, the question
of the role of IP protection in promoting the development and transfer
of technology needs to be re-examined. In particular, when compared
to other forms of stimulating innovation such as subsidies or tax
credits, the IP instrument has the well-known welfare cost that it tends
to grant firms short term market power, which leads to lower output
and higher prices for innovation. In the presence of the second
(negative) environmental externality, this welfare cost is likely to be
greater because social welfare is enhanced by the rapid diffusion of
green technology. Therefore, patents may not be the preferred policy
instrument for encouraging innovation in this area if they fail to create
a competitive market for technology that leads to more diffusion than
would be achieved in their absence.
The question of the role of IP is important in light of the ongoing
discussion on how to address climate change. In its latest report, the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Ad-hoc
Working Group on Longterm Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA)
proposed specific IP-related regulations for the post-Kyoto
framework on climate change. The regulations proposed by
involved in the replacement of a traditional stove by an ICS. Barnes et al. (2003) suggest that
while subsidies have promoted diffusion, they did not guarantee the actual use of ICS which
depended mostly on how suitable the design of the stove was to specific local needs. For
example, traditional stoves also fulfilled functions other than cooking, such as heating and
protection from insects, whereas the design of ICS did not provide these additional benefits
(Agarwal, 1983).
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developing countries include patent pooling, royalty-free compulsory
licensing of green technologies, excluding green technologies from
patenting, and even revoking existing patent rights on green
technologies (UNFCCC, 2010). In fact, these exceptions to standard
patent regulations are already partially contained in the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) which
allows for exceptions to the exclusive rights of patents for public
policy reasons and provides for the possibility of compulsory
licensing (Derclaye, 2008; Rimmer, 2009). The Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health goes a step further in the area of
pharmaceutical patents. Considering the public good character of
environmental protection in the recent debate on climate changerelated technology transfer from developed to developing countries, a
parallel has been drawn between implications for developing
countries from patent protection in the pharmaceutical sector and
green technologies (Abbott, 2009).
In contrast, industrial economies such as the U.S. are committed
to 'prevent any weakening of, and ensure robust compliance with and
enforcement of, existing international legal requirements . . . for the
protection of IP rights related to energy or environmental technology
(U.S. House of Representatives as quoted in Rimmer, 2009). Derclaye
(2009) argues that the patent system should even be used to promote
green technologies and eliminate technologies that lead to increased
CO 2 emissions. In accordance with this view, the USPTO launched in
December 2009 its 12-month "Green Technology Pilot Program,"
under which patents related to green technologies benefit from a
substantially accelerated examination process. The UKIPO launched a
similar initiative in May 2009. The underlying assumption is that
speedier grants of patents will spur the development and diffusion of
green technologies.4 But is the existing evidence consistent with this
view?
If we unpack the question about the relationship between the
strength of the patent system and innovation in developing countries

3. Articles 7, 8, 27.2, 31 TRIPS. Note that despite the possibility of compulsory
licensing, its benefits are limited inasmuch as the licensor cannot be obliged to transfer the
corresponding know-how to the licensee (Derclaye, 2008).
4. Note that the definition of eligible patents under these fast-track schemes appears to
be somewhat arbitrary given the difficulty of defining objective technology-based criteria (for
the USPTO classification see the Federal Register Vol. 74, No. 234). This is particularly evident
in the case of the UKIPO 'green channel', where applicants are only required to explain
themselves in writing why the technology for which patent protection is sought is green (see
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-pn-green.htm).
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in a general context, we find that there are at least two separate but
related questions whose answers may be at odds with each other. The
first is whether stronger patent protection in a host country
encourages technology transfer to that country. In particular, how
does the presence of patent protection affect the behavior of foreign
firms that may potentially invest in the country, sell technology to
firms in the country, or form joint ventures with domestic firms? The
second question is whether stronger patent protection encourages
technology development in the country itself. That is, how does it
affect the behavior of domestic firms? The first question has been
easier to answer, but the second is more important for the
development of the country in question. The second question may be
particularly important in the context of climate change, as required
technologies may not be the same in developed and developing
countries. In this case, industrialized economies may not have the
incentives to engage in the development of technologies exclusively
or predominantly required by developing countries. This forces
developing countries to provide incentives to either adapt existing
technologies to their specific needs or to develop these technologies
domestically.
With respect to the first question, a priori it seems clear that
stronger IP protection in the host country should encourage (or at
least not discourage) the (active) transfer of technology in embodied
form through imports of capital goods, by foreign firms to their
subsidiaries and possibly to domestic firms, either via direct
investment in the form of partnership or licensing. Note that this
argument presumes that the intellectual property rights (IPRs) are
enforceable, which is not an innocuous assumption. Also, note that
such transfer may or may not help the local development of
innovation skills and human capital in particular when only embodied
knowledge is transferred. With respect to the second, it also seems
clear that stronger IP protection could encourage the innovative
activities of domestic firms, but could also discourage learning via
imitation and therefore inhibit technological catch-up. Which effect
dominates also depends on the level of technological development
already attained in the host country as technology transfer requires
absorptive capacity in the recipient country.
The available evidence, which we summarize later in the paper,
suggests that, "one-size-fits-all" harmonization of intellectual
property rights is not welfare-enhancing for less developed countries
(and possibly not even for emerging economies), although for large
emerging economies there is also little evidence that it would lead to a
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welfare loss. With respect to climate change-related technologies, as
suggested by the World Bank 2010 World Development Report,
"[t]here is no evidence that overly restrictive IPRs have been a big
barrier to transferring renewable energy production capacity to
middle-income countries... . In low-income countries, weak IPRs do
not appear to be a barrier to deploying sophisticated climate-smart
technologies." (World Bank, 2010,310). Moreover, the available
evidence suggests that the parallels in terms of IP protection drawn
between the pharmaceutical industry and green technology are not
warranted. A large range of different technologies can achieve
emission reductions, and for a significant share of these green
technologies, the underlying technology is mature and in the public
domain. Most technological progress is expected to come from
incremental improvements of existing off-patent technologies. While
such incremental innovation may be patentable, it leaves ample scope
for competing technologies and therefore limits the role specific
patents may play for technological progress in this area (Johnson and
Lybecker, 2009a).' This suggests that insights from the existing
experience with technology development and transfer in certain
technological areas such as pharmaceuticals may not translate directly
to green technologies.
This paper specifically addresses the implications of the IPtechnology transfer relationship for climate change mitigation in
developing countries. However, we note that there are already a
nuthtber of useful surveys of the general topic available in the
literature.6
2.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

International technology transfer typically takes place via trade,
foreign direct investment, joint ventures with local partners, or simple
technology licensing, although in the latter case, some tacit
knowledge probably also needs to be transferred.' In all of these

5. Supporting this line of argument, Arora and Gambardella (2010) provide evidence
from the chemical industry in which quick and extensive diffusion of new technologies occurred
in the presence of effective patent protection. Arora and Gambardella argue that diffusion was
possible despite strong patent rights because firms were able to develop variants of patented
chemical processes which led to effective competition in the market for technology.
6. For earlier surveys on technology transfer and IP see Branstetter (2004), Maskus
(2004), ICTSD, and UNCTAD (2003); for surveys on innovation and climate change see Popp
et al. (2010), Popp (2010), and World Bank (2010, Chapter 7).
7. See Keller (2004, 2010) for overviews of the literature on international technology
diffusion.
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cases, foreign firms run the risk that imitation by local firms may
erode some of their profits from these activities, so the presence of
enforceable IPRs should encourage these activities. In fact, Edith
Penrose goes as far as to argue that for developing countries, "the
only economic advantages to be gained from granting foreign patents
lies in the possibility that in one way or another such grants will
induce the introduction of foreign technology and capital." (Penrose,
1973,770). Obviously, in the cases of more advanced technology, the
imitation risk is highest when the host country has the capacity to
adopt and develop such technology, which implies that the risk is
generally greater in middle income countries than in low income
countries. This risk is further increased if technologies require local
adaptation in order to fit local needs and regulatory requirements and
standards. At the same time, if IPR protection is strong, foreign firms
may prefer to license technologies instead of choosing to be a local
presence, which could decrease the amount of (tacit) knowledge
transferred. This decision may also be influenced by the ability of
foreign firms to enforce license contracts. However, it is also
conceivable that stronger IPRs increase the incentives for firms to
exploit IPRs themselves instead of licensing out. It is likely that these
relationships differ by industry and type of activity, i.e.,
manufacturing or distribution.
How true is this in practice? That is, what is the evidence that
local IP protections matter when a firm considers transferring its
technology to another country?
2.1 Technology Transfer Through Trade
Maskus and Penubarti (1995) provide some empirical evidence
for a positive correlation between the strength of patent enforcement
and the level of manufacturing imports originating in Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries using a
cross-section of twenty-eight manufacturing sectors across fortyseven developed and developing countries. The authors found that the
8. Wright and Pardey (2006) note that there is often confusion regarding the scope of
patent protection. A patent is only valid in the country in which it is registered, which means
that firms in countries where a technology is not protected can use the technology without
infringing the patent. At the example of patents on transgenic traits, Wright and Pardey argue
that despite strong IPR protection in the US where most cultivars with transgenic traits have
been developed, technology diffusion to developing countries was not hampered. Wright and
Pardey (2006) argue that it is rather the lack of public investment in agricultural research that
accounts for the lack of innovation in developing countries in this area than IPR protection. The
authors suggest that adaptation of new traits might even be faster in developing countries if
stronger IPR protection were in place.
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level of manufacturing imports is positively correlated with the
strength of patent enforcement in the importing countries. The authors
also account for the potential endogeneity of the patent enforcement
measure by using an instrumental variable approach (although finding
valid instruments in this context is a difficult task). In a similar
analysis, Smith (1999) looks at the correlation between U.S. exports
and IPR protection in developing countries by estimating a gravity
equation. Smith distinguishes among countries with differing degrees
of threatened imitation -that is, the importing country's ability to
imitate. She finds a positive correlation between U.S. exports and the
importing country's strength of IP protection only for countries with
high risk of imitation. These findings have been confirmed more
recently by Awokuse and Yin (2010) who look specifically at the
relationship between imports and PR protection in China using panel
data for 1991-2004. In addition to a patent right index, Awokuse and
Yin use patent applications by foreign applicants as a measure for the
strength of IPRs in China. Awokuse and Yin find that imports by
China increase with stronger patent rights protection and that this
effect is strongest for high-tech industries.
These results suggest that trade serves as a channel for
international technology transfer, and that developed countries are
wary of transferring knowledge in embodied form to countries with
strong imitative capacity and weak IPR enforcement.
2.2 Technology Transfer Through FDI
The first author to empirically look at Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) as a channel for technology transfer was Edwin Mansfield in a
1991 survey of approximately 100 U.S. multinational firms
(Mansfield, 1994) and their experiences with sixteen countries from
all over the world. Broadly speaking, his findings were that most U.S.
multinationals evaluate the strength of IP protections in the host
country before making investments abroad; the effects varied by
industrial structure and, not surprisingly, were especially strong in the
case of R&D facilities and in the chemical and or pharmaceutical
sector. In assessing the evidence, Mansfield was careful to point out
the three factors that led to the firm's perception of IP strength: (1)
does the law protect their technology?; (2) is there adequate legal
infrastructure in the country to enable enforcement?; and (3) do the
relevant government agencies treat foreign entities the same as
domestic entities in this area? All three were to be taken into account
in answering the survey.
In Lee and Mansfield (1996), these data are augmented with data
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on actual foreign direct investment by U.S. firms in the countries
during four years from 1990 to 1993, and simple regressions are used
to show that FDI does indeed vary with the perceived strength of IP
protection. Mansfield (2000) performs a similar exercise using data
on firms in Japan and Germany as well as the U.S. and finds even
larger effects. Given the relatively small sample size in the U.S. study
(effectively sixteen countries, although there are forty-eight
observations due to the time dimension), this result is reassuring.
Heald (2003) critiques the strength of the conclusions drawn
from this study as making too little a distinction among the different
kinds of IP rights that might be used. In particular, although the study
is often cited to show that patents are important for technology
transfer, Heald argues that trade secrecy may have been equally
important in the eyes of the survey participants. The original
Mansfield article cites a number of comments by survey participants
that suggest disclosure of proprietary information is what they fear
most. As Heald points out, this information is already disclosed if the
invention has been patented elsewhere, so the presence or absence of
local patent protection may be irrelevant. Turner and Heald (2004)
propose a new survey that distinguishes among the various kinds of
IP rights, but unfortunately, their survey achieved response rates that
were too low for valid analysis (Turner, 2010, private communication
with author).
In a major study of U.S. multinational firm behavior in response
to the strengthening of patent systems in sixteen middle income
countries during the 1990s, Branstetter et al. (2006) found that royalty
payments received for technology, R&D spending by the firm's local
affiliates, and foreign-origin patent applications at the USPTO all
increased following these changes, especially if the firm in question
was already a heavy patent user and therefore presumably dependent
on patents to secure returns to innovation.
Javorcik (2002) studies the relationship between a country's
probability of receiving FDI and its level of IP protection for twentyfour Eastern bloc transition economies for the period 1989-1994.
Javorcik uses the Ginarte and Park (1997) IPR index which measures
statutory IP enforcement and complements it with information on
actual IPR enforcement. Her findings suggest that the level of IPR
protection is positively correlated with the propensity to receive FDI
in high-tech sectors.9 In countries with weak IPR protection, FDI
9. "High-tech sectors" were defined as including: (1) drugs, cosmetics, and health care
products; (2) chemicals; (3) machinery and equipment; and (4) electrical equipment.
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focuses on distribution activities instead of the establishment of local
production facilities. In a similar analysis, Park and Lippoldt (2008)
analyze the relationship between the strength of IPRs and technology
transfer measured as inward FDI stocks and imports of goods and
services for a sample of 120 countries over the period 1990-2005. The
authors construct separate Ginarte-Park type indices for patents,
trademarks, and copyrights to measure the strength of IP protection in
a given country. The authors find the patent rights index is positively
correlated with all three measures of technology transfer. This
positive relationship is weaker for trademarks and copyrights. With
regard to technology transfer to developing countries, Park and
Lippoldt find a positive association between stronger patent rights and
high-tech imports such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and office and
telecom equipment. Their data also suggests a positive correlation
between the number of patents held by non-residents in developing
countries and the amount of FDI and imports of goods and services
received. The authors argue that this shows that foreigners transfer
new technologies in the presence of strong IP rights.
The literature reviewed above treats FDI as a single homogenous
channel of technology transfer. Ito and Wakasugi (2007) distinguish
between different types of FDI. They estimate the probability of
affiliates of Japanese manufacturing multinational companies
engaging in R&D in a sample of developed and developing host
countries where they distinguish between affiliates conducting R&D
at the plant site without the establishment of a research laboratory,
and at both the plant site and a research laboratory. Ito and Wakasugi
interpret the former as a sign that an affiliate conducts only R&D to
adapt existing technologies to the host market, whereas the latter is
regarded as "knowledge sourcing R&D" which involves the creation
of new knowledge and technologies. Ito and Wakasugi find a positive
correlation between the strength of a host country's IPR enforcement
regime measured as a patent right index and the probability of a
Japanese affiliate conducting knowledge sourcing R&D. Since this
type of R&D can be expected to have the largest technology transfer
component, the finding also suggests that stronger IPRs are correlated
with increased technology transfer through the channel of FDI.
While this literature suggests that IPR enforcement is important,
there may be a large number of other factors that also influence
multinational companies' decisions to engage in FDI. Fosfuri (2004),
for example, compares the importance of IPR protection and country
risk in determining international investment activities of large
multinational chemical processing firms in seventy-five countries
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during the period 1981-1996. Fosfuri has information on three modes
of international activity of the firms in the sample, i.e., wholly-owned
operations, joint ventures, and licensing. He finds firms to be
sensitive to the measure of country risk, measured by the Institutional
Investor Credit ratings, with all three forms of a foreign firm's
engagement being negatively correlated with country risk in the host
economy. In contrast, the level of IPR protection is not correlated in a
statistically significant way with any form of foreign firms'
engagement in the host economy. This may be partly explained by the
fact that the measure of IPR protection is based on statutory
protection and might differ from actual enforcement. o It suggests that
IPRs are only part of a more complex set of FDI determinants.
Does this also help explain why we often see foreign R&D
investments in countries with weak IPR enforcement? Zhao (2006)
looks into this seeming conundrum, analyzing data on 1,567 holding
companies headquartered in the U.S. and active in forty-eight
developing and developed countries. Zhao shows that patents filed at
the USPTO by these companies receive more forward citations within
a holding company if at least half of the inventors of the patent are
located in a country with weak IPR protection. Zhao interprets this
self-citation pattern within a holding company as evidence for
disproportionately more knowledge exchange internal to the holding
company in the case of research undertaken in countries with weak
patent protection. Hence, the results suggest that multinational
companies conduct R&D in countries with weak IPR protection when
the resulting innovation is integrated into larger global R&D projects
of the holding company. In this case, the value of an innovation
emerges only when it is integrated and complemented with
knowledge and resources held by the company abroad. Therefore, the
potential loss due to imperfect appropriability of knowledge in these
countries is counterbalanced by inexpensive researchers in developing
countries, and this explains a company's' willingness to engage in
FDI in developing countries with weak IPR protection. Chen (2008)
suggests that the availability of a large pool of highly-skilled,
specialized scientists is even more important than low wages. He
investigates the motives of multinational companies to establish R&D
labs in Beijing. The results of his qualitative survey of eighteen R&D
labs established by multinational companies in Beijing also reveals a
range of other relevant location-specific factors such as the possibility
10. Fosfuri (2004) also uses the index proposed by Ginarte and Park (1997) - see also
Section 3.
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to conduct joint research projects with local research institutions and
competitive pressures on local markets to generate innovative
products.
In summary, the literature indicates a positive correlation
between FDI and the level of IPR enforcement. Considering the
extensive evidence on FDI serving as a channel for technology
transfer, this implies a positive relation between IPR enforcement and
technology transfer through the channel of FDI. However, the
literature also points to other important factors in attracting FDI, such
as country risk and the availability of low-cost highly-skilled labor.
2.3 Technology Transfer Through Licensing
Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) use data from the 1994 Carnegie
Mellon Survey on U.S. manufacturing firms conducting R&D to
investigate the relationship between firm licensing behavior and the
strength of patent protection. The authors find that the effect of
stronger patent protection on licensing depends on whether the firm
owns specialized complementary assets. If they do not, stronger
patent protection increases their propensity to license their
technology. If they have such assets, stronger patent protection leads
them to patent more but not necessarily to license more. Hence, the
positive association between the strength of patent protection and
licensing found by the authors comes from firms' increased patenting
activity rather than a direct increase in firms' licensing activities.
Smith (2001) uses a sample of U.S. firms to analyze how the
strength of patent regimes abroad influence the way in which these
firms service foreign markets. She finds a stronger positive
association between licenses by U.S. firms in countries with stronger
IPR enforcement than for exports and sales by affiliates. Smith
interprets her findings as evidence that strong IPRs give incentives to
U.S. firms to transfer knowledge to foreign companies through
licensing. Yang and Maskus (2009) support Smith's findings in a
theoretical model. Yang and Maskus show that stronger IPRs give
incentives to firms from industrialized countries to license technology
to firms in developing countries. If these developing country firms
have sufficient absorptive capacity, licensing may lead them to
increase exports and therefore enhance welfare in the developing
country.
In summary, the main conclusions from the empirical evidence
on IP and technology transfer are the following: first, the strength of
IP protection does seem to facilitate technology transfer to middle
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income countries that already have innovative capacity or are capable
of imitation. Technology licensing, imports, and foreign direct
investment in these countries respond to stronger IP regimes. The
existing evidence also suggests that absorptive capacity is important.
It facilitates technology transfer through licensing, which is the
channel involving the most disembodied technology transfer external
to the multinational company. These conclusions appear consistent
with the idea that a certain level of absorptive capacity is necessary to
make use of and learn from imported technology, but if a country has
the capacity to do so, they are more likely to receive the technology if
the foreign firm from which it comes feels that its ownership rights
will be protected. If the absorptive capacity is present but IP
protection is weak, foreign firms will tend to establish distribution
rather than manufacturing subsidiaries. Despite evidence that IP
protection sometimes encourages technology transfer, it is important
to remember that firms typically do not rank IPRs highly as an
influence on the technology transfer decision, except in the cases of
R&D facilities and very advanced technologies. Thus, specific
situations will require specific evaluations.
3. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The results on IP and technology transfer seem sensible and
consistent with a priori intuition. However, as suggested in the
introduction, the more important question for policy is the degree to
which strong IPRs impact innovation and development within a
developing country. Does stronger patent protection help to enable
and increase that country's own innovative capacity? Economists
have approached this question in three different ways: (1) using
theoretical analysis; (2) looking at the empirical relationship between
IP and innovation across countries; and (3) using individual case
studies of changes in patent law.
3.1 Theory
Chin and Grossman (2000) use a highly stylized model to assess
welfare effects on developing countries adopting patent protection for
innovations from developed economies in the presence of NorthSouth trade. Under a number of restrictive assumptions, Chin and
Grossman find for their two-country model that the Southern
country's welfare is lower when granting patent protection to
innovations from the North. In contrast, the North always gains from
patent protection in the South. Deardorff (1992) reaches a similar
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conclusion for his static two-country model, suggesting that global
welfare may even decrease if patent protection is extended to the
South. Grossman and Lai (2004) look at the choice of levels of IP
protection among groups of countries that are subject to knowledge
spillovers. They find that, in general, non-cooperative equilibria
among these countries result in stronger IP protection in developed
countries than in the less developed countries. Angeles (2005) uses a
simple North-South model with IPRs in the North and finds that the
welfare effects of adding IP protection in the South depends on the
relative income levels in the North and South; the larger the gap, the
less desirable IP protection in the South is for total social welfare.
Scotchmer (2004) considers a case where each country can
choose to have innovation provided either by IP protection for
innovators or by public sponsorship of innovation. In this case,
national treatment of innovators and harmonization across countries
both lead to too much IP protection and too little public sponsorship
in all of the countries relative to the social welfare optimum. Small
countries will favor more extensive harmonization of IP rights than
large countries if everything else is equal, because the consumer
surplus they generate is in other countries for the most part. In
addition, more innovative countries will favor more extensive IP
rights.
3.2 Empirical Cross Country Evidence
Few well-designed natural experiments exist for the study of IP
protection and innovative activity, and most are not specifically
addressed to the development question. There are, however, a fairly
large number of simple cross country studies, both contemporary and
historical. These studies vary in quality due to the presence of
simultaneity between the development of an economy and the
development of an IP system, although some of the authors have
attempted to find instrumental variables to mitigate this problem.
There are two large scale historical studies, both of which take
advantage of the variability of patent systems around the world in the
19th century. Lerner (2002) compares patenting activity in the UK
across countries with various strengths of the patent system and finds
that patenting by domestic entities at the UK patent office actually
declines when their patent system is strengthened, whereas patenting
by foreign entities increases. Moser (2005) uses Crystal Palace
exhibits as a proxy measure of innovative activity and finds that
countries with stronger patent systems do not produce more
innovation, but that innovation in countries with weak or no patent
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systems tends to favor technologies that can be protected by trade
secrets. Thus, both of these investigations fail to find strong overall
effects of patenting on innovation in the 19 th century.
In the first study of this kind using contemporary data, Park and
Ginarte (1997) use aggregate data for sixty countries during 19601990 and an index of the strength of IP rights (subject matter
coverage, term length, etc.). Using a simultaneous equations model of
economic growth, investment, schooling, and R&D investment, they
found that the strength of IP rights was positively associated with
investment and R&D investment in countries with above-median
income, but not for less-developed countries. IP rights had no
independent effect on growth above and beyond that contributed by
investment and R&D. However, Ginarte and Park (1997) also show
that the strength of IP rights in high income countries (but not in low
income countries) can be predicted by prior R&D intensity, which
raises some questions about the simultaneity of IP protection and a
country's orientation towards R&D and innovation. That is, it is
possible that the demand for IP protection increases when a large
share of the industrial base is engaged in innovative activities. In a
more recent study, Allred and Park (2007) use an updated patent
rights index to look at the relation between IPR protection and
patenting at the country level for a sample of 100 countries during
1965-2000. Allred and Park find a non-linear relationship between the
IPR index and domestic patenting - for low values of the index, a
strengthening of IPR enforcement is negatively correlated with patent
counts whereas the relationship is positive beyond a threshold level of
the index. Also using the Ginarte-Park patent rights index, Park and
Lippoldt (2008) find for their analysis a positive correlation between
patent strength and the number of patent applications by developing
countries as well as R&D intensity, i.e., R&D expenditure as a
percentage of GDP. The authors interpret this as evidence for stronger
IP rights to be beneficial for the domestic development of technology
in developing countries.
The study by Kanwar and Evenson (2003) looks at the variation
across countries in R&D spending as a function of the Ginarte-Park
index over the 1981-1990 period for a sample of thirty-two countries
and finds similar results, with stronger IP protection related to higher
R&D intensity. While the authors find a positive correlation between
the IP rights index and R&D intensity, the study makes no attempt to
explore the potential endogeneity of the relationship as higher levels
of IP protection might drive higher levels of R&D spending and vice
versa. The potential endogeneity is investigated directly in Kanwar
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and Evenson (2009) for a similar sample of forty-four developed and
developing countries (1981-2000). To account for potential
endogeneity of R&D intensity in their regression of the patent rights
index on R&D intensity, Kanwar and Evenson (2009) use three
instruments: (i) one period lagged scientific and engineering journal
publications, (ii) the percentage gross enrollment rate in tertiary
education and (iii) in secondary education. The authors argue that
these instruments are valid when also controlling for per capita
income and education levels in the equation of interest." Comparing
the results obtained using a specification with and without
instruments, Kanwar and Evenson cannot reject equality of the
estimates, suggesting exogeneity of the R&D intensity variable.
Moreover, Kanwar and Evenson (2009) do not find a robust
correlation between R&D intensity and IP strength.
Chen and Puttitanum (2005) look at sixty-four developing
countries during the 1975-2000 period, using a two equation model
where the strength of IPRs is a function of the development level,
trade openness, economic freedom, membership in the WTO, whereas
innovation (proxied by patenting at the US Patent Office) is a
function of IPR strength, development level (GDP per capita),
economic freedom, and population. Thus, the instruments for IPR
strength are confined to trade openness and WTO membership, which
makes identification rather weak. Nevertheless, they show that IPRs
have a positive effect on innovation and also that there is a U-shaped
relationship between IP strength and the level of development, with
IP strength first decreasing and then increasing. Because they
included a quadratic for GDP per capita in the IPR equation but not in
the innovation equation they cannot say whether the innovation-IP
relationship is also U-shaped.
Qian (2007) performs a thorough analysis of the effects of
introducing pharmaceutical product patents in eighty-five countries
during the years 1978-1999 using matched samples and fixed
country-effect estimation. She finds that national patent protection
does not stimulate domestic innovation activities except at higher
development levels, and that above a certain level of patent
protection, innovation activities are actually reduced. McCalman
(2001) develops a growth model of bilateral technology transfer and
tries to quantify the welfare effects of patent harmonization due to the
TRIPS agreement. He finds large transfers to the U.S. from
11. An overidentification test suggests exogeneity of the instruments. However, the test
can only indicate validity of a subset of the instruments and not of all three instruments.
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developing countries, and also from Canada, the UK, and Japan.
A few conclusions have emerged from this body of work. First,
introducing or strengthening a patent system (lengthening the patent
term, broadening subject matter coverage or available scope,
improving enforcement) results in an increase in patenting and also in
the use of patents as a tool of firm strategy (Lerner, 2002; Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001), although there is some evidence that the opposite is
the case at very low levels of IPR protection (Allred and Park, 2007).
This is to be expected, but it is much less clear that these changes
result in an increase in innovative activity (Lerner, 2002), although
they may redirect energies toward patentable activities and away from
those that can be kept secret within the firm (Moser, 2005). 12 A third
finding from the empirical literature is that if there is an increase in
innovation due to patents, it is likely to be centered in the
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical instrument areas, and
possibly specialty chemicals.13 Yet evidence provided by Wright and
Shih (2010) and Lei et al. (2009) for the agricultural biotechnology
sector in the U.S. cautions that the overall effect of stronger IPR
protection on innovation may be negative.
Fourth and finally, the existence and strength of the patent
system affects the organization of industry by allowing trade in
knowledge, which facilitates the vertical disintegration of knowledgebased industries and the entry of new firms that possess only
intangible assets (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Arora et al., 2003; Arora

12. Wright and Shih (2010) provide an example of how a significant strengthening of
IPRs in agricultural biotechnology in the US during the 1980s has led to an increase in private
investment in applied research, but has had a negative impact on basic public research. Wright
and Shih (2010) argue that the possibility to protect plant varieties has led to a narrow focus on
applied research in private sector investment. Patentability also led to a proliferation of
fragmented IPRs in this technology field which caused the industry to concentrate to avoid
costly IPR sharing. Due to its applied character, private sector investment still relies on public
basic research. Wright and Shih (2010), however, report that scattered upstream IPRs impede
access to research inputs needed in publicly funded downstream research. Lei et al. (2009) make
the important point that IPRs as such are not responsible for this lock-in effect. On the one hand,
their survey among academic agricultural biologists reveals that academic scientists find it
increasingly difficult to innovate because of IPRs, mostly due to material transfer agreements
(MTAs). On the other hand, Lei et al. (2009) point out that IPR protection is an obstacle
principally because "it induces institutional administrators, whose financial priorities scientists
do not generally share, to encourage or mandate the use of MTAs in exchange of such tools."
(Lei et al., 2009: 39).
13.
This conclusion relies mostly on survey evidence from a number of countries which
shows rather conclusively that patents are not among the most important means to appropriate
returns to innovation, except perhaps in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, biotechnology, and
some specialty chemicals (Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2001; Arora et al.,
2001; Graham et al., 2010).

2010] PATENT PROTECTION IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

505

and Merges, 2004). The argument is that by creating a strong property
right for the intangible asset, the patent system enables activities that
formerly had to be kept within the firm because of secrecy and
contracting problems to move out into separate entities. Although
limited to two (large) sectors, research supports this conclusion in the
chemical and semiconductor industries.
3.3 Case Studies
The case study evidence on innovation and development is
somewhat mixed. For example, Western Europe, and in particular the
UK and Germany, had patent protection during most of the industrial
revolution, and there were some episodes where such protection
appeared to slow rather than hasten technological change (Kanefsky,
1978, as cited by Nuvolari, 2001). Episodes of invention and
innovation without patents also existed. 14 The German chemical
industry in the nineteenth-century experienced robust growth during a
period when patents were available on processes but not on products
(Murmann, 2003). Allen (2006) also provides evidence suggesting
that the invention and fast diffusion of machines during the industrial
revolution were the result of a combination of relatively high wages
and cheap energy in Britain. This created incentives to substitute
energy for labor through inventions biased towards saving labor.
Allen (2006) suggests that while patents may have played a role in
providing incentives to inventors, the main driver of the inventions
during the industrial revolution in Britain were relative factor prices
rather than changes in the IP system. This idea of induced
technological change, i.e., changes in relative factor prices inducing
technological change to reduce the input of the relatively more
expensive factor, goes back to Hicks (1932). In fact, Allen (2006)
points out that the enactment of the English patent law in 1624 before
the onset of the industrial revolution appears to have had little impact
on innovation in the seventeenth-century.
Several authors have pointed to the fact that a number of
successful cases of technological development appear to have taken
place in the absence of strong patent protection until a certain level
had been reached. The United States did not have national treatment

14. For examples, see Foray and Hilaire-Perez (2001) on the Lyons silk weaving
cooperative, Allen (1983) on the iron industry of Cleveland (UK) over the period 1850-1875,
and Nuvolari (2001) on the cooperative incremental development of Comish pumping
equipment (a policy that was a response to the mine owners' experience with aggressive patent
enforcement by Watt).
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of foreign patent applicants until the signing of the Paris convention
in 1883, and domestic inventors were therefore free to copy
inventions from the U.K., among others, during most of the
nineteenth century. This encouraged local technology development
and learning by imitation. Taiwan has followed a similar pattern, with
little use of IP protection, especially internationally, until innovators
in the country had developed a successful imitation strategy.
Taiwanese inventors only began patenting at the USPTO in 1975 and
then significantly increased their patenting in 1985.
As Kim (2002,6) says in summarizing his review of Korean
technological development:
strong IPR protection will hinder rather than facilitate technology
transfer and indigenous learning activities in the early stage of
industrialization when learning takes place through reverse
engineering and duplicative imitation of mature foreign products.
It is "only after countries have accumulated sufficient indigenous
capabilities with extensive science and technology infrastructure to
undertake creative imitation in the later stage that IPR protection
becomes an important element in technology transfer and industrial
activities."
It is noteworthy that Korea joined the Paris convention only in 1981,
greatly strengthening its patent and copyright laws in 1986, and that
patenting by Korean inventors in the United States increased
significantly only in 1988 (Kumar, 2003).
In Japan, the story is not as clear. Japan has had a patent system
since the nineteenth century. After defeat in World War II, a patent
system of one claim per patent that allowed for utility models, pregrant opposition, and early disclosure clearly designed for
incremental and or adaptive invention was in place. In addition, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry took an active role in
negotiating technology transfer licensing agreements from foreign
firms, and during the same period incoming FDI faced difficulties
(Maskus, 2004). La Croix and Kawaura (1996) point out that the
introduction of pharmaceutical product patents in 1975 in Japan did
increase R&D in that sector. Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) show
that the strengthening of the Japanese patent system in 1988-1993 did
not result in increased R&D spending by Japanese firms, and
Branstetter and Nakamura (2003) report that further reforms in the
1990s did not increase innovative performance (measured as the
productivity of R&D) either.
Kumar (2003) provides an overview of the historical relationship
between IPRs, technology, and economic development in the East
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Asian countries, and his study reaches much the same conclusions as
Kim (2002): "Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have absorbed substantial
amounts of technological learning under a weak IPR protection
regime during the early phases."
Ryan (2010) reaches a different conclusion for his case studies in
the bio-medical sector in Brazil. Brazil represents an interesting
setting to study the effect of the presence of patents on technology
development as it introduced product patents on pharmaceuticals only
in 1996. Ryan concludes from the study of five innovation projects in
the bio-medical industry that the introduction of pharmaceutical
product patents has led domestic companies to invest in the
development of new drugs and thus promoted domestic innovation.
However, Ryan shows that cooperation with public sector research
institutions was crucial in allowing private firms to innovate. He also
finds that existing experience with manufacturing generics was very
helpful for the firms when the patent regime changed to one where
innovative new products were favored.
Finally, Lger (2005) investigates the role of IPRs in the maize
breeding industry in Mexico. IPRs relevant to this industry include
patents, plant breeders' rights, and trademarks. Through interviews
with twenty-five breeders representing the population in the industry,
Lger finds an extremely low use of IPRs in the industry. Her
qualitative evidence gathered through interviews with breeders
suggests that the low use of IPRs is due to a lack of information on
the IP system among local breeders, high perceived costs associated
with obtaining IPRs, as well as difficulties enforcing the rights. As a
result, local breeders do not perceive IPRs to increase incentives for
R&D. In contrast, IPRs were found to be more important to
multinational companies and are thought to provide incentives to
foreign breeders to adapt technologies to Mexican needs.
In conclusion, the literature on the link between IP and domestic
development of technology does not lead to a clear conclusion. While
there exists some coherent evidence pointing to the importance of
IPRs for domestic innovation, especially in certain industries, there is
also convincing (historical) evidence questioning the robustness of
this relationship.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
This section of the paper discusses climate change-related
technology development and transfer from developed to developing
countries. The global public good character of environmental
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protection adds another layer of complexity to the issue of IP
protection and technology development and transfer discussed so far.
The double externality involved in climate change-related
technologies implies that additional policy intervention is necessary.
This section, therefore, also discusses different forms of policy
intervention targeted at the environmental externality, notably marketbased regulations such as carbon taxes and top-down interventions
like mandatory renewable energy shares in total energy consumption
or the replacement of incandescent light bulbs with energy-saving or
halogen light bulbs.
4.1 The Challenge of Climate Change
While current estimates differ, there is broad consensus that the
world-wide expected welfare loss in terms of GDP due to climate
change is substantial (Stern, 2006). Existing figures suggest that
drastic reductions in carbon emission levels are needed within the
current century to keep global warming below the critical level of an
average of 2'C over pre-industrial revolution levels (Popp, 2010).
World-wide average estimates, however, mask enormous
heterogeneity across and within countries (Yohe and Schlesinger,
2002). Tol (2009) reviews a number of recent estimates of the
expected impact of climate change on GDP and shows that
developing countries represent by far the most heavily affected
regions. The differences in welfare losses between developed and
developing countries among the estimates reported in Tol (2009) vary
between 2.9 percentage points (Hope, 2006) and 36.4 percentage
points (Rehdanz and Maddison, 2005). 15 Some of the studies
reviewed in Tol (2009) even suggest small net benefits from moderate
global warming of the order 1-20 C for some industrialized economies.
This enormous inequality in the consequences of climate change
between developed and developing countries results mostly from the
climatic conditions prevailing in developing countries that will
deteriorate disproportionately more as a consequence of even
moderate increases in average temperatures. However, part of the
vulnerability to climate change stems also from developing countries'
reliance on the agricultural sector and less ability to adapt to climate
15. There is a large body of literature analyzing the impact of climate change on specific
developing countries suggesting potentially large welfare losses, although outcomes vary
substantially depending on the assumptions made on the extent of climate change reflecting the
prevailing uncertainty in this context. The considerable projected income losses in developing
countries are to a significant extent explained by their dependency on the agricultural sector,
which is most directly affected by climate change (Winters et al., 1998).
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change due to a lack of appropriate technologies.
The main challenge in providing incentives for the development
and transfer of green technologies is the double externality problem
discussed in the introduction. In addition, the development and
adoption of green technologies may involve large sunk costs paired
with long time lags in pay-back thresholds, as well as a large amount
of uncertainty about future price developments and regulatory
changes. The relevant question is whether IP protection - at least
partially - addresses these issues.
4.2 Climate Change-RelatedTechnologies
Climate change is ascribed to the emission of greenhouse gases
which include long-lived gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2
methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N 20) as well as short-lived gases
such as water vapor and ozone (03). The most important greenhouse
gas by volume is C0 2, which is emitted during the fossil fuel
combustion process.
The dramatic reduction in carbon emissions needed to counter
climate change can be achieved through reduced energy consumption
per unit of output holding current technologies fixed (energy
efficiency) and the introduction of new technologies that lower
carbon emissions per unit of energy consumed holding energy use
fixed (carbon efficiency). The most promising path is to combine both
a reduction in energy consumption and the introduction of new
technologies requiring less energy for the same output. An alternative
is to reduce emissions by reducing total economic activity, holding
energy and carbon efficiency constant.16 Since this alternative is
undesirable, in particular to developing countries, the development
and diffusion of technologies that allow increasing both energy and
carbon efficiency is needed. Note that achieving the proper balance
between these two is something for which the price system (carbon
taxes or tradable emissions permits) is well-suited, in that it would
allow individual consumers to signal their preferences.
Green technologies cover a broad range of fundamentally
different types of innovation, including alternative energy resources,
technologies employing alternative energy sources, energy storage,
distribution and management technologies, recycling and waste
technologies, industrial processes, and technologies for capture,
16. Gans (2010) uses an endogenous growth model to show that under some conditions
even policies targeted towards energy efficiency or carbon reductions can reduce overall output
enough to discourage environmentally friendly innovation.
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storage, and sequestration or disposal of greenhouse gases (Popp,
2010). The underlying technology behind green innovations differ
greatly, and range from high-tech innovation such as genetically
modified crops to low-tech innovations such as mechanical farming
techniques. These technologies differ in other ways as well, for
example the fixed costs of innovation and adoption involved and their
applicability across industries and climatic zones. Also, the degree to
which IPRs are relevant varies considerably over the broad range of
green technologies. Whereas inventions in some technological fields,
such as biotechnology, rely to a large extent on patenting, other
technologies like irrigation systems or construction techniques may be
largely free of patenting.17 For some technologies, IPRs may protect
only components of a technology while for others, IPRs protect the
end-product. Similar to the agricultural sector, the need for local
adaptation of green technologies to extremely heterogeneous local
conditions may also limit the effect of IPRs. Wright and Shih (2010),
for example, report that even in agricultural biotechnology where
strong IPRs exist, heterogeneity of technology users across space has
limited firms'ability to charge high mark-ups.
Apart from potentially different technologies needed in
developed and developing countries, developed countries mainly face
the problem of replacing existing technology with technology that is
more carbon/energy efficient. In developing countries, the challenge
consists largely in implementing green technologies from the outset.
This distinction may lead to different incentives for the adoption of
new green technologies. In particular, the benefit-cost trade-off may
be more favorable in developing countries due to lower sunk
(switching) costs.
4.3 Climate Change-RelatedPolicy Intervention
Given the double externality problem, a combination of policy
interventions that address both the imperfect appropriability and the
environmental externality are needed. Policy intervention can affect
relative prices and quantities or directly mandate the use of emissionreducing technologies. Nordhaus (2009) provides a summary of the
implications of economic analysis for climate change policies overall.
His message is that the only reliable way to send the correct signals to

17. Smithers and Blay-Palmer (2001), for example, look at how soybean growers in
Ontario, Canada have adapted to climate change by employing mechanical and biological
innovations. Smithers and Blay-Palmer point out that most mechanical technologies are not
protected by IP rights, only more recent modifications of existing technologies are.
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the many agents whose actions affect global warming (innovators,
producers, and consumers) is a carbon tax, and that such a tax leads to
undesirable effects unless it is global. He argues that the cap and trade
system does not send reliable price signals because it induces too
much fluctuation in the pricing of emissions, and it is also subject to
excessive rent-seeking. However, it has become clear that even if
such a tax is the most desirable policy option, it is going to be very
difficult to achieve. This is the background to the more specific
policies that we consider here.
Most such specific policy interventions have the primary
objective of limiting carbon emissions, which addresses the
environmental externality directly. By doing so, they also provide
incentives for the development and diffusion of green technologies,
indirectly addressing the knowledge spillover externality. Such
induced innovation can be achieved through a large range of
regulatory policies, the broadest of which are emission taxes and the
so called cap-and-trade scheme, where a limit on total emissions is set
and tradable emission rights are sold.18 Top-down regulations include
emissions performance standards, which set an emission target but no
specific regulations about how a target should be met, such as
renewable portfolio standards or restrictions on the use of
technologies such as on incandescent light bulbs. Other forms of topdown regulation include climate change mitigation such as
reforestation. Regulatory interventions can be local or global in scale.
Global harmonization of regulations can give rise to scale effects and
thus provide multiplier effects (World Bank, 2010).
There are also policy interventions targeting the development of
technologies more broadly in the form of R&D incentive schemes, for
example subsidies and tax credits. If these policies favor green
technologies, in principle they can address both the knowledge
spillover and environmental externality. Popp (2010) argues that
R&D subsidies serve as an incentive to develop green technologies
while regulatory policies are essential in promoting the diffusion of
the new technologies. Thus, specific R&D incentives should be
applied in tandem with regulatory policies; such combined policy
intervention is particularly important for technologies that only
achieve improved carbon efficiency without increasing energy
efficiency, in which case social benefits exceed private benefits by
far. An example is carbon control equipment such as catalytic
18. See Scotchmer (2009) for a theoretical comparison of the relative effectiveness of
emissions taxes and the cap-and-trade regulation.
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converters for automobiles.
While such R&D incentive schemes may be effective in
promoting the development of green technology, there is some
concern that increased R&D expenditure on green technology may
crowd out other R&D expenditure and therefore lead to an ambiguous
net welfare outcome. In general equilibrium of course, the crowding
out is welfare-enhancing by design - by fully incorporating the social
welfare cost of environmental degradation in the incentives for R&D
directions, policy-makers have ensured that R&D directed towards
green technologies is valued more by society than other R&D. But in
the short run, there are some effects that make the general equilibrium
outcome harder to achieve. These include a lack of scientists and
engineers needed for increased R&D spending and a concomitant rise
in their wages (David and Hall, 2000; Goolsbee, 1998), or a lack of
scientists and engineers with the relevant expertise. The opportunity
cost of climate change-related R&D (and that of processing and
administering IPRs) is particularly relevant to developing countries
where resources are heavily constrained.
Popp (2004) provides evidence that even in the presence of
substantial crowding out, there are net social benefits from climate
change-related R&D. Gerlagh (2008) provides an explanation for
Popp's findings showing that increased R&D on green technology
mostly crowds out R&D devoted to carbon-producing technologies
rather than other carbon neutral R&D. These results are echoed by
Popp and Newell (2009) at the firm-level. These authors confirm that
crowding out occurs mostly for innovations enhancing the
productivity of fossil fuels. However, as Nordhaus (2009) points out,
an appropriate carbon tax can send the right signals for clean
technology development and would allow for the preservation of
neutrality in any R&D subsidies.
There is some empirical evidence from developing countries on
the effectiveness of policy interventions in promoting green
technologies. Fisher-Vanden et al. (2006) investigate the increase in
energy efficiency and drop in total energy consumption in China
during the period 1997-1999 using a panel of 2,582 large and
medium-sized Chinese firms. Apart from shifts in output across
industries, the authors find evidence that increases in energy prices as
well as the development of new technologies measured as R&D
expenditure account for the drop in energy intensity and use.
Although the analysis does not single out the effect of increased
energy prices as a consequence of the elimination of state-set energy
prices on firm-level R&D expenditures, it may be suspected that the
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negative association between energy intensity and R&D expenditures
found by Fisher-Vanden et al. (2006) reflects firms' innovative
responses to increased energy prices. Evidence for a positive
correlation between energy prices and innovation has also been found
in the U.S. by Popp (2002), and at a more aggregate level by
Dechezlepr&re et al. (2009), who look at the share of climate changerelated patenting in total patents and oil prices over the period 19782005.
Jaffe and Palmer (1997) provide some additional insights by
looking at the association between costs of complying with
environmental regulation and innovation measured as R&D and U.S.
patent applications by U.S. corporations for 2- and 3-digit
manufacturing industries in the U.S. Jaffe and Palmer find a positive
correlation between lagged environmental compliance expenditures
and R&D, although they find no statistically significant correlation
between compliance expenditures and patenting. The authors suggest
that a possible explanation for their findings is that environmental
regulations lead to incremental R&D which does not lead to
patentable research output. This would imply that environmental
regulation triggers R&D that is tailored towards complying with the
regulations, rather than the invention of genuinely new technologies.
However, this study is an aggregate industry level study, with
identification coming from the time series behavior of the key
variables. Thus, strong conclusions are not warranted, as the authors
are careful to point out.
The international nature of the environmental externality
increases the complexity of policy regulation considerably. If
international differences in regulatory stringency and enforcement
exist, incentives arise for pollution-intensive companies to conduct
their activities where environmental regulations are least costly. Dean
et al. (2009) use data on FDI in the form of equity joint ventures in
the manufacturing sector in China for the period 1993-1996 to
investigate whether differences in de facto environmental regulations
have an impact on foreign investors' location choice within China,
since environmental stringency varies across Chinese provinces. Dean
et al. construct a measure of regulatory stringency based on the
average collected levy per ton of wastewater at the province level.
They find that projects in high-pollution sectors by investors from
Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines
avoid provinces with high pollution taxes. Projects from investors
such as the U.S., E.U. and Japan do not appear to respond to
environmental regulatory stringency in their location choice. The
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interpretation is that firms from developed economies employ greener
technologies and are therefore less sensitive to environmental levies.
Still, this does not imply that firms located in OECD countries do not
react to domestic environmental regulation by re-locating production.
For example Hanna (2010) shows that US-based multinationals
reacted to increased environmental regulatory stringency introduced
by the Clean Air Act Amendments in the U.S. by expanding existing
FDI activities abroad, albeit not disproportionately more so in
developing countries.
4.4 Climate Change-Related Technology Development
To answer the question of whether IP rights hinder the
development and transfer of green technologies, a report by
Copenhagen Economics (2009, commissioned by the European
Commission) analyzes patent data for seven green technology fields
for a sample of thirty-eight developing and emerging countries over
the period 1998-2008.19 The study notes a strong increase in green
technology patent counts designating a small group of emerging
economies including Brazil, China, and India. The increase in green
technology patents designating these countries is in solar energy, fuel
cells, and wind energy. However, in the least-developed countries
included in the sample, patents for green technologies are absent, as
are patents in general. The absence of patents on green technologies
in the least-developed countries leads the report to conclude that IPRs
do not represent a barrier to the development and transfer of green
technology in the least developed countries. However, one could
argue equally well that the absence of these patents means that firms
do not view the countries as profitable markets for green technology
innovations. One possible explanation for the absence of IPRs in
these countries is their reliance on low-tech innovations. If these lowtech innovations correspond to the environmental challenges in these
countries, this suggests that the low patent counts found for green
technologies are not the result of market failure and that there is no
20
specific role for IPRs in this context.
Lanjouw and Mody (1995) look at the distribution of climate
change-related patents for seventeen countries, including OECD
19. The technologies are wind, solar energy, fuel cell, geothermal, ocean, biomass and
waste.
20. Shafik (1994) provides cross-country evidence for a panel of 149 countries over the
period 1960-1990 suggesting that countries tackle different environmental problems at different
stages of their development. Hence, Shafik suggests that less developed economies might be less
interested in patented frontier technologies than emerging economies.
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members and a heterogeneous set of low- and middle-income
countries.21 They find a large concentration of climate change-related
patents among Japan, U.S., and Germany.2 2 Given the time period
analyzed, 1971-1988, China still lags far behind, although the number
of environmental patents granted in Brazil is already noticeable.
Dechezlepretre et al. (2009) extend the work by Lanjouw and Mody
and use a more a comprehensive database (PATSTAT) to investigate
in more detail the geographical distribution of inventions in thirteen
climate change-related technologies between 1978 and 2005.23 The
authors use patent families as a measure for domestic inventions and
patents of the same family as a measure of technology transfer where
the country of residence of the inventors of the first patent application
is regarded as the originating country of the technology.
Similarly to Lanjouw and Mody, Dechezlepretre et al. (2009) use
the PATSTAT data and find that the overwhelming share of inventors
of granted patents between 1978 and 2003 reside in Japan, the U.S.,
and Germany, and account together for nearly sixty percent of all
patents in the chosen technological fields. China is the only
developing country within the top ten countries, accounting for a
share of eight percent of patents. However, it is worth noting that
inventors in the top three countries account for eighty-two per cent of
USPTO patents overall during this period, while China accounts for
less than one per cent, so that in fact climate change-related patenting
is probably less concentrated than patenting as a whole.
How should these results be interpreted? The insights that can be
gained from studies such as Lanjouw and Mody (1995) and
Dechezlepr6tre et al. (2009) are limited because they can only
describe patenting patterns that are the outcome of the interaction of a
range of factors and do not shed light on the causal determinants of
the observed patent counts and their geographical distribution.
However, they do suggest that technological change in this area may
be more widely dispersed than in other areas, probably reflecting the
fact that it is a relatively recent area of innovation in which some

21. The technological fields are industrial and vehicular air pollution, water pollution,
hazardous and solid waste disposal, incineration and recycling of waste, oil spill clean-up, and
alternative energy.
22. As discussed further below, eighty-two per cent of all USPTO patents granted
between 1971 and 1988 were held by inventors in these three countries, so this result is not
surprising.
23.
These are wind, solar, geothermal, marine energy, biomass, hydropower, waste-toenergy, methane destruction, climate-friendly cement, thermal insulation in buildings, heating,
electric and hybrid vehicles, and energy efficient lighting.
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developing countries benefit from geographical advantages. Another
important issue regards the identification of patents covering climate
change-related technologies. There are substantial differences in the
definition of the relevant technology classes across the different
studies discussed above.24 In part, differences are accounted by
changes in the IPC system and relevant technologies over time; yet,
some arbitrariness remains making comparisons of results across the
different studies difficult.
Popp (2001) looks directly at the association between energy
patents and energy consumption for the U.S. between 1959 and 1991.
He finds negative elasticities of energy consumption with respect to
energy patents in eight out of thirteen manufacturing sectors. When
combined with findings by Popp (2002) that show a positive elasticity
of the share of energy patents in total patents with respect to energy
prices, these results suggest that an increase in energy prices induces
innovation measured as patent counts which are negatively correlated
with energy consumption. This research, therefore, suggests that there
is a positive correlation between energy prices, green patenting, and a
fall in energy consumption.
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from our
discussion. First, while there is a growing body of literature on the
determinants of the development of green technologies focusing on
the range of available policy interventions, the existing literature
specifically addressing the link between IPRs and the development of
climate change-related technologies is surprisingly small, and it is
even more so with regard to developing countries. Second, the sparse
existing evidence suggests above all that there is substantial
heterogeneity amongst developing countries. A small number of
countries, above all Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, are engaging in
the development of green technologies and gaining a noticeableshare
in the worldwide technology market for certain technologies, mostly
in the area of renewable energies. Since these countries also have
strengthened their IPsystems in the recent past, it may be tempting to
conclude that there is a positive relationship between IPRs and the
development of climate change-related technologies. This conclusion,
however, is not warranted based on the available evidence, as this
relationship may be confounded with a whole range of other factors.
Work from the U.S., however, suggests that there may exist a positive
association between green technology patents and reductions in
24. Technologies are identified by patents' IPCs (International Patent Classification)
which represent a patent and utility model specific technology-oriented classification system.
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energy consumption.
4.5 Climate Change-RelatedTechnology Transfer
Similar to the development of green technologies discussed in
the preceding section, the diffusion of technologies that merely
achieve improved carbon efficiency without increasing energy
efficiency will not occur without some form of regulation or subsidy
(Snyder et al., 2003). In contrast, technologies increasing energy
efficiency may be adopted and diffused without policy intervention as
private benefits may exceed private costs (Rose and Joskow, 1990).
Yet diffusion may still be suboptimal from a social perspective if the
cost of adoption does not factor in social benefits. Diffusion may also
not occur in the presence of market failures and behavioral biases in
decision-making (Gillingham et al., 2009). Indeed, it has been
observed that diffusion of green technologies is lower than a
comparison of private costs and benefits would suggest. There are
several explanations for the so called "energy efficiency paradox"
(Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). These are high discount rates used by
consumers, large up-front fixed costs, credit constraints, agency
problems and uncertainty about future price developments.
While there exist a number of studies on international
technology transfer from developed to developing countries,
"compared to the more general literature on international technology
transfer, applications pertaining to the environment are scarce" (Popp
et al., 2009, 50), and even scarcer when it comes to developing
countries.
Lanjouw and Mody (1995) find in their analysis of climate
change-related patents for seventeen OECD and developing countries
substantial evidence that technology transfer occurs from developed
to developing countries, but not in the other direction, since very few
patents in OECD countries are granted to developing countries. At the
same time, Lanjouw and Mody find that a non-negligible share of
patents in developing countries are granted to domestic inventors.
Interpreting the evidence, Lanjouw and Mody suggest that developing
countries engage mostly in adaptation of technologies transferred
from OECD countries. This interpretation is confirmed by assessing
the importance of patents granted to OECD inventors in developing
countries. Using citation data and family size as measures of a
patent's importance, Lanjouw and Mody find that patents granted to
OECD inventors in developing countries are of a broad nature and
most likely not tailored to local needs. In their similar, albeit more
recent analysis of global patenting in climate change-related
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technology fields, Dechezleprtre et al. (2009) show that most
technology transfer in green technologies occurs within OECD
countries. Among non-OECD countries, only China registered a
noteworthy share of patent filings by OECD applicants. These results
should be interpreted with caution as Lanjouw and Mody (1996, 561)
note that the "extent of foreign patenting is a crude measure of
technology transfer."
Barton (2007) chooses instead a case study-based approach
looking specifically at three specific sectors (photo-voltaic, bio-mass,
and wind energy) in Brazil, China, and India. He finds IPRs to have
little impact on technology transfer in these sectors. Barton suggests
that competition among technology suppliers within the three
technological fields analyzed act as an effective constraint to firms'
attempts to exploit their patent rights. At the same time, the prevailing
oligopolistic market structure poses a risk for collusion and thus a
barrier to entry for new small firms, which, according to Barton
(2007), represents a more important threat to technology development
than IPRs. However, Barton notes that in the area of wind energy,
there exists some evidence for firms using their patents as a strategic
competitive tool and there is also some risk that new broad patents
might hinder future innovation.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol also introduced market-based
interventions designed to promote technology transfer between
developing and developed countries (so called Annex 1
countries). 2 5,2 6 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows
polluters in developed countries to receive Certified Emission
Reduction (CER) credit for undertaking projects in developing
countries that reduce emissions and is regarded as "one of the most
innovative tools of the Kyoto Protocol" (Dechezlepr8tre et al., 2008,
1273). Firms in developed countries have incentives to engage in the
CDM, as it is usually cheaper to achieve required emission reductions
in developing countries. However, the incentives provided by CDM
go beyond the cheaper fulfillment of emission reductions as it allows
Annex 1 countries are developed countries and countries in transition, including the
25.
members of the European Union, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, the U.S., Turkey, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. Annex 2
countries are the developed country subset of this grouping.
26. Another mechanism instituted by the Kyoto Protocol promoting technology transfer is
the Joint implementation (JI) scheme. However, JI is limited to Annex I countries and therefore
concerns mostly technology transfer to Eastern European economies from Annex 2 countries
(Youngman et al., 2007).
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firms to engage in new markets. For example, Costa et al. (2008)
provide case study evidence for the Dutch waste management
industry showing that firms not subject to emission limits also engage
in CDM projects. While allowing developed countries to achieve
emission targets at reduced cost, the CDM is designed to lead not
only to embodied, but also to disembodied technology transfer to
developing countries. The CDM scheme, therefore, offers an
opportunity to analyze the extent of existing technology transfer
between developed and developing countries.
Dechezleprtre et al. (2008) uses a dataset of 644 CDM projects
to investigate the extent of technology transfer occurring through the
CDM scheme. The authors find that only forty-three percent of all
projects include some form of technology transfer component,
although these projects account for eighty-four percent of total
expected annual CO 2 emission reductions by all projects. Thirty-four
percent of projects include disembodied technology transfer. They
also show that the share of projects including technology transfer
varies substantially across technology classes. With regard to the
geographical distribution of the CDM projects, Dechezlepr&re et al.
find a strong concentration (seventy-three percent) in Brazil, China,
India and Mexico. Nevertheless, there is also substantial
heterogeneity within this group, as fifty-nine percent of Chinese
projects involve technology transfer but only twelve percent of Indian
projects. Unfortunately, Dechezlepretre et al. (2008) do not relate
their data on CDM projects to information on IPRs, except via a
technological capability variable provided by Archibugi and Coco
(2004) that incorporates previous patenting in the country. This
measure yields mixed results across sectors; it is positively correlated
with technology transfer in the energy and chemical industries and
negatively so in the agricultural sector.
In an analysis of similar data, Doranova et al. (2009) show
evidence for a negative correlation between USPTO patenting in
climate change-related technologies by a CDM project host country
and the probability that the CDM project relies on local technologies
instead of transferring foreign technology. Taken at face value, this
suggests that countries with patents in climate change-related
technologies are more likely to benefit from foreign technology
transfer through CDM projects possibly because they are at a more
advanced stage of development. A conclusion that can be drawn from
the analysis of CDM projects is that there exists considerable
heterogeneity among developing countries in attracting CDM
projects. However, the analysis is limited in terms of its insights with
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regard to the role of IPRs in technology transferred in CDM projects.
There are also private initiatives that are not directly induced by
regulation that promote transfer of green technologies. An example of
open access to climate change-related IPRs is the Eco-Patent
Commons initiative coordinated by the business association World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 27 A
number of large multinational companies have pledged to grant
patents in climate change-related technological fields that can be used
without a license.28 A quantitative analysis of the effect of putting
these patent rights in the public domain on technology development
and transfer could shed light on the importance of IPRs for
technology transfer in the context of climate change. Of course, a
cynic could interpret these patent donations as an indication that the
companies do not perceive any profit opportunities from using these
patents that are large compared to the public relations benefit from
making them available.
Another promising avenue for green technology transfer is the
joint projects between private companies, such as the DESERTEC
project officially launched in July 2009.29 The project envisions the
large-scale production of energy through solar thermal power plants
and windmills in the deserts of North Africa and the Middle East to
supply these regions as well as the EU with renewable energy through
a high-voltage direct-current grid connecting these three regions. The
project is carried out by a consortium of European and Algerian
companies, although it is expected to soon also include Moroccan,
Tunisian, and Egyptian firms. An investigation of the role played by
patented technologies in the project could deliver additional insights
on their effect on international cooperation among firms.
The review of the existing literature on technology transfer in the
context of climate change-related technologies provides little
conclusive evidence. Studies looking at patenting by foreign
companies as a measure of technology transfer suggest that most
technology exchange is occurring between OECD countries. Casestudy based evidence attributes no significant role to IPRs in
transferring technology. The available evidence for the role of patents
in promoting technology transfer provides tentative evidence at best

27. http://www.wbcsd.org/web/epc.
28. As of February 2010, a selection of patents assigned to Bosch, DuPont, Fuji-Xerox,
IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes, Ricoh, Sony, Taisei, The Dow Chemical Company, and Xerox are
available under Eco-Patents Commons.
29. http://www.desertec.org.
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for patents fostering technology transfer. Yet, this result is inline with
the evidence found in the general literature on the link between IPRs
and technology transfer discussed in Section 2.
5. CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper was to review the existing evidence
on the link between IPRs and the development and transfer of climate
change-related technology. For this purpose, we also reviewed the
established literature on the broader nexus between IPRs and
development and transfer of technology.
The general overview suggests the following conclusions:
*Stronger patent enforcement encourages patenting in
general, although it is not clear that the increase in
patenting reflects increased underlying innovation or the
increased use of patents as a strategic tool. IPR protection
may also redirect research to applied and patentable
research with potential negative effects for the generation
of fundamental drastic innovation.
*Stronger patents encourage technology transfer in the form
of imports, FDI, and licensing to developing countries.
*Stronger patents have little effect on technology transfer to
the lowest income countries.
elt is difficult to find clear evidence that stronger patents
positively impact innovation except in chemical-related
sectors including pharmaceuticals. Many other factors
matter, so the experiments are often not clear. We do not
observe enough variation in patent systems, and there is
little evidence on how much time firms need to respond to
changes in IPR regimes. It is also rare to have an
independent measure of innovation (other than patents) that
allows to disentangle changes in innovation and patenting,
so ingenuity is required.
Regarding the link between the development of green
technologies and IPRs, we draw the following conclusions:
*Climate change-related technologies comprise a vast range
of fundamentally different technologies addressing distinct
climate change-related problems. Patenting propensities
and patent effectiveness differ substantially across different
technological fields. This makes it highly unlikely that a
single, universal mechanism characterizes the nexus
between IPRs and the generation and diffusion of green
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technologies within countries. Also, since different
technologies are appropriate for different countries
depending on their location, industrial structure, and stage
of development, it is highly unlikely that a single, universal
mechanism characterizes the nexus between IPRs and the
generation and diffusion of green technologies across
countries.
*IPRs can address the gap between private and social returns
to innovation that results from the public good
characteristics of knowledge. However, IPRs are not
designed to remediate environmental externalities and in
fact may not be the best way to close the gap in their
presence. Other policy interventions are required to
mitigate environmental externalities. Therefore, the
discussion of IPRs and green technology has to be framed
within the setting defined by policy interventions
specifically
designed
to
address
environmental
externalities.
eThere are a number of other issues apart from IPRs that are
of first-order importance in setting incentives for the
development and transfer of technologies, most notably
large uncertainty regarding the innovative process of new
technologies (Johnson and Lybecker, 2009b). Developing
countries themselves may also generate powerful
distortions inhibiting the production and transfer of green
technologies. A report by Copenhagen Economics (2009)
suggests that subsidies for the consumption of fossil fuels in
some developing countries, such as Venezuela, Iran and
Indonesia, may represent a significant barrier to the
development and transfer of green technologies in these
countries. Barton (2007) suggests that import tariffs on
photo-voltaic and wind technology in place in India and
China may also act as a barrier to technology development
and transfer. In contrast, import tariffs and subsidies for
biofuels in place in industrialized countries, above all the
E.U. and the U.S., hamper the development of this industry
in developing countries, such as Brazil (World Bank, 2010).
Similarly, in January 2009, the U.S. customs agency
decided that imports of solar panels to the U.S. should be
treated as imports of electric generators and thus subject to
a duty of 2.5 percent. Such import barriers on green
technologies represent a complex issue because there must
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be policy interventions in place in developed countries
dedicated to market creation (Taylor, 2008) such as
subsidies, to promote demand for green technologies
produced in developing countries. From a political
economy perspective, it is unclear how far developed
economies are willing to subsidize demand for green
technology from abroad. This problem has already emerged
in the case of feed-in price regulation in Germany, which
caused a large increase in imported solar panels from
China.
*Existing studies using patent counts to describe the
geographical distribution of inventors of green technologies
and their international transfer are by construction limited
in terms of insights they can deliver. While useful in
improving our understanding of the patenting distribution in
green technologies across sectors, countries and time, these
studies cannot deliver an answer to the question of whether
IPRs help or hinder the development and transfer of green
technologies. Furthermore, to-date there exists no
consensus with regard to the definition of relevant
technology classes as identified by patents' IPCs. However,
any interpretation of results hinges crucially on this
definition.
*The limited existing evidence suggests that there are two
groups of developing countries. In the first group are
emerging economies, such as Brazil, China, India, and
Mexico, and in the second group a larger number of lessdeveloped countries. Similar to the conclusion drawn from
the general literature on technology development and
transfer, the evidence on green technologies suggests that a
strengthening of IPRs for the group of emerging economies
will most likely have a positive impact on the domestic
development of technology and its transfer from developed
economies. The available evidence does not allow drawing
a similar conclusion in the case of less developed countries.
*On the whole, the existing evidence on the role of IPRs in
promoting the development and diffusion of climate
change-related technologies is surprisingly sparse and does
not provide sufficient insight to reach any substantial
conclusion. This calls for additional efforts in investigating
the relationship between IPRs and green technologies
specifically in developing countries.
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